When unlikely outcomes occur: the role of communication format in maintaining communicator credibility by Jenkins, Sarah C. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
When Unlikely Outcomes Occur: The Role of Communication Format in Maintaining 
Communicator Credibility 
 
 
 
Sarah C. Jenkinsa, Adam J. L. Harrisa and R. M. Larkb 
 
a Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London. 26 Bedford Way, 
London, WC1H 0AP. 
b British Geological Survey (BGS), Environmental Science Centre, Keyworth, Nottingham 
NG12 5GG.  
 
Sarah C. Jenkins was funded by an IMPACT studentship from UCL, half funded by the 
British Geological Survey (BGS). R.M. Lark’s contribution is published with permission of 
the Director, BGS. Murray Lark is now at Division of Agriculture & Environmental Sciences, 
University of Nottingham, Sutton Bonington Campus, LE12 5RD. We are grateful to Dr 
Charlotte Vye-Brown (BGS) for assistance with creating the vignette used in Experiment 1. 
 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sarah C. Jenkins, 
Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, 
London, WC1H 0AP, UK. E-mail: s.jenkins.12@ucl.ac.uk 
 
Word count (main text): 8052 (excluding abstract and figure captions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Abstract 
The public expects science to reduce or eliminate uncertainty (Kinzig & Starrett, 2003), yet 
scientific forecasts are probabilistic (at best) and it is simply not possible to make predictions 
with certainty. Whilst an ‘unlikely’ outcome is not expected to occur, an ‘unlikely’ outcome 
will still occur one in five times (based on a translation of 20%, e.g. Theil, 2002), according 
to a frequentist perspective. When an ‘unlikely’ outcome does occur, the prediction may be 
deemed ‘erroneous’, reflecting a misunderstanding of the nature of uncertainty. Such 
misunderstandings could have ramifications for the subsequent (perceived) credibility of the 
communicator who made such a prediction. We examine whether the effect of ‘erroneous’ 
predictions on perceived credibility differs according to the communication format used. 
Specifically, we consider verbal, numerical (point and range [wide / narrow]) and mixed 
format probability expressions. We consistently find that subsequent perceptions are least 
affected by the ‘erroneous’ prediction when it is expressed numerically, regardless of whether 
it is a point or range estimate. Our findings suggest numbers should be used in consequential 
risk communications regarding ‘unlikely’ events, wherever possible. 
 
Keywords: verbal probability expressions; numerical probabilities; risk communication; 
trust; expertise; credibility 
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Imagine your house is located on a floodplain, 10 km away from a river. Recently there has 
been considerable rainfall. Consequently, you are worried about rising river levels and the 
possibility of flooding. A geologist announces that “it is unlikely the floodwaters will extend 
10 km from the river.” Four days later, the riverbanks burst and floodwaters do extend 10 km, 
flooding the ground floor of your house. How would you feel? Was the prediction incorrect? 
Would you trust the geologist again? 
In the current paper, we investigate scenarios in which events forecast to be ‘unlikely’ 
nevertheless occur. We term these forecasts ‘erroneous’, despite the fact scientific forecasts are 
probabilistic (at best) and it is simply not possible to predict with certainty the probability of, 
for example, floodwater extending a certain distance. An ‘unlikely’ (e.g. 20% likelihood; Theil, 
2002) event is not impossible – one in five times it will occur, based on a frequentist 
interpretation of probability. People’s misunderstandings of the nature of uncertainty (e.g. 
thinking a prediction ‘erroneous’), and/or the expressions used to convey uncertainty, might 
negatively influence perceptions of a communicator’s credibility. This paper addresses such 
misunderstandings in relation to three communication formats and their variants: verbal 
probability expressions (VPEs; e.g. ‘unlikely’), numerical expressions (e.g. point – ‘20% 
likelihood’, range – ‘10–30% likelihood’), and mixed expressions (e.g. ‘unlikely [20% 
likelihood]’)1. Our decision to focus on ‘unlikely’ and its associated numerical probabilities 
was made primarily because events with highly consequential outcomes, such as geological 
hazards, are usually unlikely (c.f. Harris & Corner, 2011; Weber & Hilton, 1990). Individuals 
often discount such events and thus fail to prepare for them (McClure, Henrich, Johnston, & 
Doyle, 2016). 
 
                                                          
1 In line with standard dictionary definitions, we use ‘likelihood’ as a synonym for ‘probability’ in the present 
paper, though note that, mathematically, each has a unique and specific definition. 
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Credibility 
Most individuals do not have in-depth knowledge about, nor experience of, hazards and new 
technologies (Siegrist, Gutscher, & Earle, 2005) (the focus of many risk communications), so 
they are often reliant on mediated information from an external source (Sjöberg, 2000). 
Credibility is one of a communicator’s most precious assets (Covello & Allen, 1988); with trust 
and expertise identified as two key components (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Mowen, 
Wiener, & Joag, 1987; Wiener & Mowen, 1986). Trust relates to the reliable and unbiased 
nature of the communicator (Dieckmann, Mauro, & Slovic, 2010), with expertise relating to 
the knowledgeability of the communicator (Guilamo-Ramos, Jaccard, Dittus, & Bouris, 2006). 
Whether a source is perceived as credible or not will influence how a risk is perceived 
and thus how an individual behaves upon receiving a risk communication (Wachinger, Renn, 
Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013), for instance taking action to avoid, mitigate or adapt to the risks 
emphasised in the communication. Perceiving a source as untrustworthy could lead an 
individual to ignore such risks. Credibility’s influence is far-reaching, though has largely been 
neglected in investigations of effective risk and uncertainty communication. 
Credibility and Communication Format 
People expect experts to provide precise information (Shanteau, 1992). Precision is often used 
as a cue for high expertise, with preference given to an advisor who gives precise estimates 
(Jerez-Fernandez, Angulo, & Oppenheimer, 2014). Given this, it is reasonable to assume a 
communicator who uses a (precise) numerical point estimate of uncertainty (e.g. 15%) will be 
perceived as more credible than one who uses a (less precise) verbal or range2 expression. 
However, there is evidence to suggest the way expressions are perceived depends on the 
characteristics of the event in question. The congruence principle (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995) 
                                                          
2 Throughout the paper, ‘range format’ refers to probability ranges (e.g. 10-30% likelihood), rather than general 
range estimates (e.g. 3 – 5 km). 
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states that the precision of the communication should be consistent with how precise one can 
be in describing the (un)certainty of the outcome. Using a point estimate to describe the chance 
of a natural hazard (which is, by nature, highly uncertain) might be perceived as overly precise. 
The recognition that such precision is unwarranted for such an event may reduce a 
communicator’s perceived credibility. Use of a less precise format may consequently be 
perceived as more appropriate in such a situation.  
Range Formats. 
Research on how range formats are perceived is mixed, with Longman, Turner, King and 
McCaffery (2012) observing reduced understanding with range, as opposed to point, estimates. 
Han et al. (2011) also observed greater worry with risk estimates presented as ranges. Other 
research has found point and range estimates (e.g. ‘as low as 1% and as high as 5%’) to be 
perceived as equally credible, trustworthy, accurate and personally relevant (Lipkus, Klein, & 
Rimer, 2001), with no difference in perceived risk / harm, nor severity (Sladakovic, Jansen, 
Hersch, Turner & McCaffery, 2015). 
 Another body of research, however, suggests benefits of using ranges in risk 
communications. It has been suggested that being open about levels of uncertainty may lead to 
enhanced credibility (Chess, Hance, & Sandman, 1988). In this vein, range estimates have been 
found to be not only more useful (Dieckmann et al., 2010), but also more honest (Johnson & 
Slovic, 1995) than point estimates, perhaps because they openly acknowledge uncertainty at 
the outset (Joslyn & LeClerc, 2012). The usefulness of a range may, however, depend on its 
width. Previous research has observed a preference for narrow range forecasts (Du, Budescu, 
Shelly, & Omer, 2011) over wider ranges, with the former perceived as more competent and 
trustworthy (Jørgensen, 2016). Indeed, people trust precise forecasts more, despite the fact such 
forecasts have a smaller chance of capturing the actual outcome than less precise forecasts 
(Løhre & Teigen, 2017).  
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The aforementioned research has so far solely focused on how communicators will be 
perceived with reference to their predictions, rather than in combination with actual outcomes. 
When the actual outcome is opposite to what was predicted (an ‘erroneous’ prediction), a 
communicator who used a range format was perceived as more credible, and blamed less than 
one who used a point (percentage) format to describe the risk of a terrorist attack (Dieckmann, 
et al., 2010).  
Verbal Formats. 
It could be suggested that VPEs may be perceived similarly to range formats, given they openly 
acknowledge uncertainty and have consistently been shown to refer to a range of probabilities 
(e.g. Budescu & Wallsten, 1995). However, research generally highlights the disadvantages of 
using VPEs in risk communications. Gurmankin, Baron and Armstrong (2004) investigated the 
effect of verbal and numerical statements of risk (percentage / fraction) on trust and comfort in 
a physician in a hypothetical medical communication. Participants were more trusting of, and 
more comfortable with, numerical versions of the information, though this effect decreased 
with lowering levels of numeracy. Such findings coincide with the observation that individuals 
prefer to receive information in a numerical format, though prefer to communicate information 
using VPEs – the so-called Communication Mode Preference paradox (Erev & Cohen, 1990). 
Even behavioural differences have been observed between verbal and numerical 
communication formats. Peters, Hart, Tusler and Fraenkel (2014) compared the use of numeric 
and non-numeric formats (including a VPE condition) to describe the likelihood of medication 
side effects (probabilities ≤ 14%). Participants were more willing to take the medication when 
side effects were presented in a numeric format, suggested to result from the heightened risk 
perceptions of those in the non-numeric condition. In contrast, Doyle, McClure, Paton and 
Johnston (2014) used range expressions featuring higher probabilities (e.g. 45-55%, 73-83%) 
and found that more people recommended evacuating when the risk of a volcanic eruption was 
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described using ranges compared to VPEs. They attributed this to the ambiguity of VPEs – 
numerical terms were perceived as more certain and thus required more immediate action. 
Further evidence of the disparity between numerical formats and VPEs derives from 
research adopting the ‘which-outcome’ approach, used to examine understanding of VPEs (e.g. 
Juanchich, Teigen, & Gourdon, 2013; Løhre & Teigen, 2014; Teigen, Juanchich, & Filkuková, 
2014; Teigen, Juanchich, & Riege, 2013). In this approach, participants are shown a histogram 
of potential outcomes and asked to complete a probability statement (e.g., “It is unlikely that 
the floodwater will extend __ km”) with a value considered appropriate. Participants tend to 
complete the ‘unlikely’ sentence with a value that exceeded any represented in the histogram, 
equivalent to a 0% likelihood of occurrence – the ‘extremity effect’ – an effect which was not 
observed with numerical probabilities (Juanchich et al., 2013; Jenkins, Harris & Lark, in press). 
The ‘extremity effect’ could plausibly be attributed to directionality (Teigen, 1988; Teigen & 
Brun, 1995, 1999), which drives expectations about outcomes (Teigen & Brun, 2003). Phrases 
which have negative directionality (e.g. ‘unlikely’) focus one’s attention on the non-occurrence 
of the event, whereas those with positive directionality (e.g. ‘likely’) focus on the occurrence 
of the event. Therefore, a participant in a W-O task who reads the sentence featuring ‘unlikely’ 
will focus on the event not occurring, potentially leading them to complete the sentence with 
an outcome which has never previously occurred.  
The ‘extremity effect’ poses a problem for communicators of risk and uncertainty who 
use communications featuring VPEs. If ‘unlikely’ is used to convey an intended meaning of 
20%, but is instead interpreted as equivalent to 0%, such a mismatch could adversely affect 
confidence in subsequent communications (Breznitz, 1984). Furthermore, whilst mixed format 
expressions have been proposed as a solution to the problem of miscommunications (e.g. 
Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009), simply adding a numerical expression after the VPE (e.g. 
‘unlikely [20%]’) may not be enough to wholly prevent such a mismatch occurring. Indeed, 
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the ‘extremity effect’ is observed  in verbal-numerical (V-N) expressions (Juanchich & Sirota, 
2017; Jenkins et al., in press), indicating such expressions will be susceptible to the effects of 
directionality. Altering the order of the mixed format to create a numerical-verbal (N-V) 
expression (e.g. ‘20% likelihood [unlikely]’), however, is enough to nearly eliminate the 
‘extremity effect’ (Jenkins et al., in press).  Therefore, it is not only reasonable to expect that 
numerical expressions will be more robust to ‘erroneous’ predictions than VPEs, but also 
reasonable to believe numerical-verbal (N-V) expressions will be superior to V-N expressions 
as well. 
Overview of Proposed Research  
The present paper advances our understanding of the effects of communication format on 
credibility by investigating the effect of ‘erroneous’ predictions. Experiment 1 incorporated 
mixed expressions (V-N, and the previously unconsidered N-V format) and compared them to 
a numerical point estimate and VPE. Building on key findings from Experiment 1, Experiments 
2 and 3 investigated the influence of the precision of the expression, by including additional 
range (narrow / wide) formats, in conjunction with events differing in perceived predictability. 
All three experiments explored the potential influence of numeracy. Ascertaining the effect of 
the aforementioned factors is vital to building and maintaining the trust of the public, especially 
given the ‘crisis of trust’ science has suffered (House of Lords, 2000). Our main hypotheses 
were as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. 
VPEs will suffer the greatest loss of credibility after an ‘erroneous’ prediction (compared to 
numerical expressions). Similarly, V-N expressions will be less robust to ‘erroneous’ 
predictions than numerical-verbal (N-V) expressions. 
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Hypothesis 2. 
Ranges will be more robust against ‘erroneous’ predictions than numerical point expressions, 
as per the congruence principle (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995). 
Hypothesis 3. 
As per the congruence principle, outcome characteristics (such as how predictable the event is 
perceived to be) will interact with range width. A narrow range will be perceived more 
positively than the wide range for the more predictable event. In contrast, for the less 
predictable event, the wide range will be perceived more positively than the narrow range. 
 
Experiment 1  
Method 
Participants. 
300 Native English speakers were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Nine participants 
failed the attention check (“How good are you at surviving one hour without oxygen?” (c.f. 
Martire, Kemp, Watkins, Sayle, & Newell, 2013)) and were excluded from the study, leaving 
a final sample of 291 participants (146 male), aged 19 – 80 (Mdn = 33). Participants were paid 
$0.60. Ethical approval for all studies in this paper was granted from the Departmental Ethics 
Chair for Speech, Hearing and Phonetic Sciences (University College London). 
Design. 
Communication format had four levels, manipulated between participants. Participants were 
randomly allocated to either a verbal – “unlikely”; numerical – “20% likelihood”; V-N – 
“unlikely (20% likelihood)” or N-V – “20% likelihood (unlikely)” condition.  
Participants answered questions regarding trust and expertise. Expertise was 
operationalised as: “How knowledgeable does the expert seem?” rated from 1 – ‘Not at all 
knowledgeable’ to 5 – ‘Extremely knowledgeable’. Trust was operationalised as: “How much 
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do you trust that the expert is giving you complete and unbiased information?” (Dieckmann, 
Slovic, & Peters, 2009), rated from 1 – ‘Not at all’ to 5 – ‘A great deal’. For greater clarity of 
results (i.e. avoiding repetition of similar analyses), these measures were averaged to form a 
credibility score. Credibility was found to be highly reliable, both pre- and post-outcome (α = 
.74, α = .86, respectively). As we were interested in how robust credibility perceptions were to 
‘erroneous’ predictions, credibility difference scores ([post-outcome credibility rating] – [pre-
outcome credibility rating]) were our main focus for analyses.  
As previous research has found a disparity between explicit ratings of trust and more 
implicit behavioural measures of trust for various information sources (O’Neill, 2002; 
Twyman, Harvey, & Harries, 2008), we used ‘decision to evacuate’ (Doyle et al., 2014) as a 
measure of the latter. This was rated from 1 – ‘Definitely should evacuate today’ to 5 – 
‘Definitely should not evacuate today’. Once more, we were interested in the change in such 
decisions after an ‘erroneous’ prediction. Consequently, difference scores ([post-outcome 
evacuation rating – pre-outcome evacuation rating]) were calculated and served as the primary 
dependent measure of implicit credibility. We did not make directional predictions for this 
behavioural measure since the directional effect a reduction in implicit credibility will have is 
difficult to predict a priori. Any difference, however, would be suggestive of a change in 
implicit perceptions of trust in the communicator. Participants also indicated why they made 
their decision. 
After providing their second credibility ratings, participants were also asked “How 
correct was the geologist’s prediction?” rated from 1 – ‘Not at all correct’ to 5 – ‘Completely 
correct’ (Teigen, 1988; Teigen & Brun, 2003).  
Numeracy was measured using Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer’s (2001) numeracy scale with 
two additional questions from the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & 
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Garcia-Retamero, 2012). The latter were included to increase variability in scores, given we 
have previously observed MTurk samples to be highly numerate. 
Materials and Procedure. 
After consenting to participate, participants indicated their age and gender before completing 
an attention check. Participants then read a brief introduction. On the next screen, participants 
read a vignette about an ongoing volcanic eruption (see Supplementary Materials 1 for full 
vignette), in which lava flows were expected. A volcanologist communicated the probability 
of the lava flows travelling a certain distance:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants then provided initial ratings of expertise and trust in the expert’s prediction. 
On the subsequent screen, participants were informed that the capital city was at risk from the 
volcanic eruption (given its location 3km from the volcano) and asked to rate whether to 
evacuate the city today or not, as well as why they made this decision. A mass evacuation was 
described as being ‘very expensive and extremely disruptive to residents’. 
On the following screen, participants were informed that the unlikely outcome did in 
fact occur – the lava flow extended beyond 3.5km. They were asked to provide further trust 
and expertise ratings, as well as rating how correct the volcanologist’s prediction was in light 
“Mount Ablon has a history of explosive eruptions that have 
produced lava flows. An eruption is currently underway and 
lava flows are expected. Volcanologists from Ablon Geological 
Centre are communicating information about the volcano. A 
volcanologist has suggested that, given the volcano’s recent 
history, there is a 20% likelihood (unlikely) that the lava flow 
will extend 3.5km from the point of eruption” (N-V condition, 
emphasis in original). 
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of the outcome. On the next screen, participants were informed that it was now 2019 (two years 
later), and were presented with the same prediction from the volcanologist. They were then 
asked the two evacuation questions as before.  
Finally participants answered the numeracy questions and upon completing the study, 
they were given a code to claim their reward, thanked and debriefed (see Figure 1 for a flow 
chart of the procedure). 
Results 
As mentioned above, our focus was the change in ratings and decisions after an ‘erroneous’ 
prediction, so our analyses focus on difference scores.  Analyses of all pre-outcome ratings are 
available in Supplementary Materials 2 (across all three experiments, there were no robust 
effects of format on credibility). 
Answers for each numeracy question were coded as 1 if correct and 0 if incorrect, such 
that numeracy scores could range from 0 to 10. The distribution of numeracy scores is shown 
in  
Table 1. Given the highly skewed distribution of responses, participants with scores of 
eight or under were categorised as low numeracy, and those with nine or above categorised as 
high numeracy. Each dependent measure was entered into a 4 (communication format) × 2 
(numeracy) ANOVA. 
Credibility Ratings. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, all communication formats suffered from a loss of perceived 
credibility post-outcome, but to a different degree, F (3, 282) = 7.61, p < .001, η𝑝
2= .08.  The 
numerical format was the most robust to the ‘erroneous’ prediction, and the verbal format 
suffered from the greatest reduction in credibility. A post-hoc Gabriel’s procedure 3 
                                                          
3 Gabriel’s procedure is recommended for use with unequal group sizes (Field, 2013). Critical value includes 
adjustment for multiple comparisons.  
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demonstrated that the verbal format was significantly different to the numerical format (p < 
.001), with the numerical format significantly different to the V-N format (p < .001). There 
was a non-significant trend for the communicator to suffer a greater reduction in perceived 
credibility when rated by the high numeracy group, F (1, 282) = 3.40, p = .07, η𝑝
2= .01. The 
effect of communication format was not qualified by an interaction with numeracy, F (3, 282) 
= 0.85, p = .47. η𝑝
2= .014.  
Correctness Rating. 
Correctness ratings followed the pattern of differences in the credibility ratings, with the 
numerical format seen as ‘least incorrect’ and the verbal format seen as ‘most incorrect’ after 
the outcome had occurred (see  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3), F (3, 282) = 26.40, p < .001, η𝑝
2= .22. A post-hoc Gabriel’s procedure demonstrated 
a significant difference between the verbal and both numerical (p < .001) and N-V (p < .001) 
formats. The numerical format was also significantly different to the V-N format (p < .001). 
There was no effect of numeracy, F (1, 282) = 1.69, p = .20, η𝑝
2= .01 nor an interaction 
between format and numeracy, F (3, 282) = 0.41, p = .75, η𝑝
2= .004.5 
Decisions to Evacuate. 
                                                          
4  Across all experiments, results for interactions remain non-significant if numeracy is entered as a continuous 
variable. 
5 Results for credibility and correctness ratings were replicated in a Prolific Academic sample (n= 300). 
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There was little change in how certain participants were about evacuating (pre-outcome, M= 
2.67. SD= 1.19, post-outcome M= 2.06, SD= 1.28; see Table 2), with no significant effect of 
communication format, numeracy, nor an interaction between the two factors (all ps > .23). 
Discussion 
All formats suffered a reduction in credibility after the ‘erroneous’ prediction. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, the numerical (verbal) format was perceived as least (most) incorrect. The poor 
performance of the verbal format could plausibly be explained with regard to directionality 
(Teigen, 1988; Teigen & Brun, 1995, 1999). We find clear evidence of people’s sensitivity to 
the order of mixed format expressions (see Figure 2 and 3), in line with previous findings 
(Jenkins et al., in press). 
We found no effect of communication format on decisions to evacuate, in contrast to 
Doyle et al. (2014). A large number of responses to the question of why people made their 
evacuation decision mentioned themes such as ‘evacuating just in case’ and ‘better to be safe 
than sorry’. There was little cost to the participant to adopt such an approach, which could 
explain the relatively high proportion of people choosing to evacuate immediately. We 
modified this behavioural measure in subsequent experiments. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, numerical expressions outperformed both verbal and mixed format 
expressions. Numerical point estimates have, however, previously been criticised for 
portraying a false level of certainty (Schwartz, Woloshin, & Welch, 1999). Experiment 2 was 
therefore designed to extend the type of uncertainty estimates investigated by including a range 
format (‘10 – 30% likelihood’). We used two scenarios which, from pilot testing, were 
perceived very differently by participants, both in terms of a) how predictable the event was 
and b) how precise the communicator could be in describing the likelihood of the event.  
Method 
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Participants. 
Two hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, with seven 
cases removed due to failing the attention check, leaving a final sample of 243 (114 male) 
participants aged between 20  – 77 (Mdn = 33). Participants were paid $0.40 for this 10 minute 
study. 
 
Design. 
Format (verbal – “unlikely”; numerical point – “20% likelihood”; numerical range –  “10 – 
30% likelihood”) and scenario (forest fire [rated the least predictable / precise in the pilot study] 
and flood [rated the most predictable / precise]) were manipulated between-participants in a 3 
× 2 design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions.  
Credibility measures were the same as in Experiment 1. For the behavioural measures, 
participants were first given a ‘willingness to pay’ measure in the context of home insurance 
(see Figure 4)6, and then also completed an adapted version of the tolerable risk scale7 (Haynes, 
Barclay, & Pidgeon, 2008).  
Materials and Procedure. 
Participants read a vignette about a current forest fire or flood in which a geologist 
communicated the risk of fire or floodwater travelling a certain distance (see Supplementary 
Materials 4). The procedure was the same as Experiment 1 (see Figure 1), though included the 
different behavioural measures. 
Results 
Credibility Ratings. 
                                                          
6 Values for this task were selected on the basis of results from pilot testing. 
7 Further details and analysis of this scale is presented in Supplementary Materials 3. No significant effects or 
interactions were observed. 
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Credibility was found to be highly reliable, both pre- and post-outcome (α = .81, α = .86, 
respectively). As can be seen in Figure 5, all communication formats suffered from a loss of 
perceived credibility post-outcome, but to varying degrees, F (2, 231) = 11.58, p < .001, η𝑝
2= 
.09. The verbal format suffered from the greatest reduction in credibility and a post-hoc 
Gabriel’s procedure demonstrated that the verbal format was significantly different to the 
numerical point (p < .001) and range (p < .001) formats, though there was no significant 
difference between the latter two. Credibility difference scores were not affected by numeracy, 
F (1, 231) = 0.04, p = .85, η𝑝
2  < .001, or scenario, F (1, 231) = 0.53, p = .47, η𝑝
2= .002. No two 
or three way interactions were significant (all ps > .09).  
Correctness Ratings. 
Correctness ratings followed the pattern of the credibility ratings (see Figure 6), with the 
numerical point and range formats perceived as ‘most correct’ and the verbal format seen as 
‘least correct’ after the outcome had occurred, F (2, 231) = 33.97, p < .001, η𝑝
2= .23. A post-
hoc Gabriel’s procedure demonstrated that the verbal format was significantly less correct than 
the point (p < .001) and range (p < .001) formats, though the latter two were similarly perceived. 
There was no significant effect of scenario, nor numeracy, nor any two or three way interactions 
(all ps > .16). 
Insurance Decisions. 
Participants who provided inconsistent responses (e.g., indicating they would not pay £750 for 
insurance, but would pay £800) were removed from analysis, even if they were only 
inconsistent at one time point. All participants were willing to pay more for insurance after the 
outcome occurred (see Table 2), but this was not significantly affected by communication 
format, F (2, 218) = 1.12, p = .33 η𝑝
2= .01, scenario, F (1, 218) = 2.38, p = .13 η𝑝
2= .01, or 
numeracy, F (1, 218) = 0.74, p = .39, η𝑝
2= .003. No two or three way interactions were 
significant (all ps > .09). 
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Discussion 
Whilst we observed an effect of format on both ratings of credibility and correctness, there 
were no differences between ratings for the numerical point and range formats, in contrast to 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of format is driven solely by the verbal format, replicating findings 
from Experiment 1. No effects of format, scenario or numeracy were observed for either of the 
behavioural measures. 
Our results add to the mixed findings of research exploring the effect of using numerical 
ranges on perceptions of the communicator. Our results coincide with those of Lipkus et al. 
(2001) who found both range and point estimates were perceived similarly in terms of 
credibility and accuracy. It is possible the divergent findings in the literature may have arisen 
from differences in the size of the range presented, a factor considered in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to examine whether the precision of the range would affect 
perceptions of credibility, and follows recommendations to further explore how people respond 
to varying range sizes (Longman et al., 2012). It also provided a further opportunity to test the 
congruence principle and check the generalisability of key results in Experiments 1 and 2. We 
continue to use the range featured in Experiment 2, hereafter refered to as the wide range 
format, and include a new, narrower, range format. 
 We also included measures of worry / concern and likelihood ratings in order to draw 
further comparisons to prior research (Han et al., 2011; Lipkus et al., 2001; Sladakovic et al., 
2015). We expected a prediction made using an uncertain expression (wide numerical range) 
would be perceived as more worrisome and less likely than a prediction using a point estimate. 
Method 
Participants. 
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Two hundred and fifty-five Native English adult speakers were recruited from Prolific 
Academic (www.prolific.ac), with two cases removed for failing the attention check, and seven 
for duplicate IP addresses, leaving a final sample of 246 (124 male) participants aged between 
18 – 69 (Mdn = 31). Participants were paid £0.85 for this 10 minute study.  
 
Design, Materials and Procedure. 
Communication format (numerical point – “20% likelihood”; wide range – “10 – 30% 
likelihood”; narrow range – “15 – 25% likelihood”) and scenario (forest fire and flood) were 
manipulated between-subjects. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the six 
conditions.  
The dependent variables were as in Experiment 2, with two changes. The tolerable risk 
scale was removed and two additional measures were added – worry / concern ratings and 
likelihood ratings. Participants answered the following: “How worried / concerned would you 
be given the geologist’s prediction that …” rated from 1 – ‘not at all worried’ to 5 –  ‘extremely 
worried’ and “How likely do you think it is that the [e.g.] forest fire will extend 80km from its 
origin, given the geologist's prediction that there is a 20% likelihood of this occurring?” rated 
from 1 – ‘not at all certain’ – 7 ‘completely certain’.  
Results 
Credibility Ratings. 
Credibility was found to be highly reliable, both pre- and post-outcome (α = .82, α = .89, 
respectively). The narrow range format seemed to suffer a smaller loss of credibility compared 
to the other numerical expressions (see Figure 7). However, a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA 
revealed there were no significant differences between communication formats, F (2, 234) = 
1.85, p = .16, η𝑝
2= .02. There was also no effect of scenario, F (1, 234) = .1.57, p = .21, η𝑝
2= 
.01. The communicator suffered a greater reduction in perceived credibility when rated by the 
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low numeracy group, F (1, 234) = 10.96, p < .01, η𝑝
2= .05, though there was a significant 
scenario × numeracy interaction, F (1, 234) = 4.97, p < .05, η𝑝
2= .02. Figure 8 demonstrates 
this interaction: whilst the credibility ratings of highly numerate participants were similarly 
affected in the flood and fire scenarios, F (1, 234) = 0.55, p = .46, η𝑝
2= .002, ratings of those 
lower in numeracy were less affected by the ‘erroneous’ prediction in the flood scenario, F (1, 
234) = 5.34, p < .05, η𝑝
2= .02. For these participants, larger reductions in credibility were 
observed in the least predictable (fire) scenario (M= -1.07, SE= 0.15) compared to the most 
predictable (flood) scenario (M= -.62, SE= 0.13).  
Correctness Ratings. 
A 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed no significant effect of communication format on correctness 
ratings, F (2, 234) = 1.03, p = .36, η𝑝
2= .01, nor of scenario, F (1, 234) = 0.79, p = .38, η𝑝
2= 
.003. The significant effect of numeracy can be seen in Figure 9 – the low numeracy group 
rated the communicator as less correct (M= 2.82, SE= 0.13) compared to the high numeracy 
group (M= 3.22, SE= 0.12), F (1, 234) = 4.92, p < 0.05, η𝑝
2= .02, though there were no 
significant two or three way interactions (all ps > 0.14). 
Worry / Concern Ratings. 
A 3 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA revealed no significant effects of communication format, scenario 
or numeracy (all ps > .42) nor any significant two or three way interactions (all ps > .20), (M= 
3.31, SE= 0.06). 
Likelihood Ratings. 
A 3 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA revealed no significant effects of communication format or 
scenario. There was a non-significant trend for more numerate participants to perceive the 
event as less likely (M= 3.17, SE= 0.11) compared to those with lower numeracy levels (M= 
3.47, SE= 0.12), F (1, 234) = 3.56, p = .06, η𝑝
2= .02.  
Insurance Decisions. 
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Those who provided inconsistent responses were removed as in Experiment 2. Participants 
were willing to pay more for insurance after the outcome, though a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed 
no significant effect of communication format, F (2, 223) = 0.83, p = .44, η𝑝
2= .01, scenario, F 
(1, 223) = 0.62, p = .43, η𝑝
2= .003, or numeracy, F (1, 223) = 0.49, p = .48, η𝑝
2= .002. There 
was a significant interaction between communication format and numeracy, F (1, 223) = 4.38, 
p < .05, η𝑝
2= .04 (see Table 2). Both the high and low numeracy groups were willing to pay 
similar amounts for insurance in the wide range, F (1, 223) = 1.30, p = .26, η𝑝
2= .01, and narrow 
range conditions, F (1, 223) = 0.12, p = .73, η𝑝
2= .001. However, in the numerical point 
condition, those in the high numeracy group were prepared to pay significantly more than those 
in the low numeracy group, F (1, 223) = 8.06, p = .01, η𝑝
2= .04. No other interactions were 
significant (all ps > .17). 
Discussion 
The current experiment finds no evidence to suggest precision of the range affects perceptions 
of credibility and correctness, contrary to Hypothesis 3. No effect of precision of format was 
observed for worry / concern or risk perceptions, in contrast to previous research in the health 
domain (Han et al., 2011; Longman, et al., 2012). The only instance in which the precision of 
the format affected responses was on the behavioural measure, though this was as part of an 
(unpredicted) interaction. 
This experiment is the first in the present paper to observe a moderating effect of 
numeracy on perceptions. Given our sample was relatively numerate and thus little separated 
those in the high and low numeracy groups, we caution against drawing steadfast conclusions 
regarding these findings until they have been replicated in a more diverse sample.  
General Discussion 
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We presented three experiments examining how perceptions of the communicator differ across 
communication formats (verbal, numerical point, numerical range [narrow, wide] and mixed 
expressions) in response to an ‘erroneous’ prediction. These experiments also considered the 
potential influence of numeracy. All experiments yielded consistent results; the first two 
replicated and extended previous findings, with the verbal (numerical point) format most (least) 
vulnerable to an ‘erroneous’ prediction. Although mixed formats (e.g. ‘unlikely [20%]’) have 
been posited as a solution to the problems of mis-communications arising from use of VPEs 
(e.g. Budescu et al., 2009), Experiment 1 provided little evidence of their added benefit, either 
in terms of credibility, correctness or behavioural decisions. Experiments 2 and 3 yielded no 
evidence to suggest differences between numerical point and numerical ranges’ vulnerability 
to ‘erroneous’ predictions. 
Robustness of the Numerical Formats 
Probability expressions convey a double message (Teigen & Brun, 2003), telling us that an 
event may occur but also that it may not. Both messages will not, however, be similarly 
attended to – the way the message is framed can influence which message is more prominent, 
as well as the message’s perceived accuracy in light of an outcome (Yeung, 2014). Framing 
can occur in VPEs through two different mechanisms (Teigen & Brun, 2003): directly – explicit 
mention of one of the complementary outcomes, or indirectly – through directionality (Teigen, 
1988; Teigen & Brun, 1995, 1999). The negatively directional term ‘unlikely’ was used in the 
current experiments, which focused attention on the event not happening. We propose that the 
verbal format was perceived most negatively (supporting Hypothesis 1) because, when the 
event occurred, it was counter to the original focus on it not happening. In contrast, the 
numerical formats lacked this original focus. Thus, when the event occurred, we suggest it was 
less unexpected. Such an explanation is in line with the findings of Teigen and Brun (2003). 
Following an outcome’s occurrence, predictions made with negatively directional VPEs were 
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rated as more ‘wrong’, and generated more surprise than their positively directional 
counterparts. 
  We recognise that the current results could have arisen from other differences in the 
way individuals reason about verbal and numerical expressions. It has previously been 
suggested that VPEs elicit an intuitive way of thinking, in comparison to the more deliberative, 
analytical type of reasoning evoked by numerical expressions (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). If 
this is the case, the latter type of reasoning might be behind the advantages observed for 
numerical probabilities. Future research could aim to compare the two accounts, by comparing  
negatively and positively directional (low probability) VPEs in the context of an ‘erroneous’ 
outcome. On the basis of the directionality account, we would expect a smaller decrease in 
credibility ratings when a positively directional VPE such as ‘a chance’ was used to describe 
the event, yielding similar ratings to a numerical expression such as ‘20% likelihood’. 
Point Versus Range Formats 
We observed no evidence for differences in the way point and range expressions were 
perceived, a null effect which persevered even when the precision of the format and 
predictability of the scenario was manipulated (contrary to Hypotheses 2 and 3). This could 
arise from the way numerical estimates are processed. It has previously been suggested that 
range estimates are processed in a similar way to point estimates. When one is presented with 
a range estimate, it is not possible to make an imprecise decision or take imprecise action 
(Karelitz & Budescu, 2004), so it is more useful to focus on a single point. If range estimates 
are processed like point estimates, it stands to reason that they might be perceived similarly 
too, potentially explaining current results. However, considering the mixed findings of 
previous research, we also consider alternative explanations below.  
 A communicator who uses precise estimates is likely to be perceived positively, given 
precision is associated with knowledge and expertise (Jerez-Fernandez et al., 2014; Shanteau, 
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1992). However, the congruence principle (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995) states that the value of 
using a precise estimate will depend on the characteristics of the event in question. In the 
current studies, using a point estimate to describe geological hazards may have been viewed as 
artificially precise, a factor known to reduce comprehension and believability of the risk 
estimate (Witteman, Zikmund-Fisher, Waters, Gavaruzzi, & Fagerlin, 2011). Whilst a range 
estimate might be deemed as more appropriate for reflecting the uncertainty associated with a 
geological hazard, use of such formats have led to questions regarding a communicator’s 
competence and ability to estimate risk and uncertainty (Dieckmann et al., 2010; Johnson & 
Slovic, 1995). Therefore it is possible that the advantages and disadvantages of each format 
served to cancel each other out in the current experiments. 
Implications for Communicating Uncertainty 
It is clear that how, and the degree to which, one should communicate uncertainty is still an 
open question. A communicator presenting uncertainty information must make a series of 
tradeoffs, to ensure the communication is made with confidence, but with precision (Moore, 
Tenney, & Haran, 2016), and is accurate, but also remains informative (Yaniv & Foster, 1995). 
Despite concerns that focusing on uncertainty may discourage action, distract people, or be 
perceived as untrustworthy (Fischoff, 2011; Frewer et al., 2003), we find no ill-effects of being 
open about uncertainty in terms of perceptions or behaviour, at least when it is numerically 
expressed (as a range versus point estimate). We therefore continue to support calls for 
uncertainty to be presented in order to enable people to make fully informed decisions (Fischoff 
& Davies, 2014; Politi, Han, & Col, 2007). 
Although the work so far has focused on one low probability VPE, ‘unlikely’, we 
suggest our findings would extend to other negatively directional VPEs such as ‘improbable’. 
We do however recognise that the extent to which our results can be generalised to positively 
directional VPEs is limited, especially as Smithson, Budescu, Broomell and Por, (2012) found 
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a larger range of interpretations were given for negatively as opposed to postively directional 
VPEs. Indeed, no differences between formats was observed when a ‘likely’ event did not 
occur (Jenkins, Harris, & Lark, 2017). 
Conclusion 
Research has predominantly studied the effects of communication format on understanding, 
but has largely neglected its influence on credibility and behavioural decisions. The present 
paper is one of the first to compare the effects of verbal, numerical [point / range] and mixed 
formats on these factors, in the context of an ‘erroneous’ prediction. Recognition of these 
effects is key to designing effective risk communications that build and maintain the public’s 
trust. Our findings show that numerical formats are consistently perceived as more credible 
and ‘less incorrect’ following an ‘erroneous’ prediction, though no differences are observed 
between point and range estimates. We thus recommend numbers should be used in scientific 
risk communications referring to ‘unlikely’ events, wherever possible.  
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Figure 1. Procedure for experiments. Dashed box represents additional measures included in 
Experiment 3. 
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Figure 2. Credibility difference scores by communication format – Experiment 1 (Error bars 
represent 1−
+  Standard Error [SE]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Correctness ratings after ‘erroneous’ prediction ) – Experiment 1 (Error bars 
represent 1−
+  SE). 
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Figure 4. Willingness to Pay – Home Insurance Measure – Forest Fire Vignette – Numerical 
Point Condition. 
 
 
 
 
You own a house in Redmill which you have been living in for 10 years. Your 
house lies within 80km of the forest. The contents of your home are 
estimated to be worth £5000. We are interested in how much you would be 
willing to pay to insure these contents against any fire damage. 
 
Based on the geologist's prediction that there is a 20% likelihood that 
the forest fire will extend 80km from its origin, please indicate how much 
you would be willing to pay to insure your home and possessions based on 
the quotes listed below. 
 
For each amount in the scale below, please indicate whether or not you would 
pay for the insurance if that was the price. 
 
 I would buy the insurance: I would not buy the insurance: 
   
£600 ☐ ☐ 
£650 ☐ ☐ 
£700 ☐ ☐ 
£750 ☐ ☐ 
£800 ☐ ☐ 
£850 ☐ ☐ 
£900 ☐ ☐ 
£950 ☐ ☐ 
£1000 ☐ ☐ 
£1050 ☐ ☐ 
£1100 ☐ ☐ 
£1150 ☐ ☐ 
£1200 ☐ ☐ 
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Figure 5. Credibility difference scores by communication format – Experiment 2 (Error bars 
represent 1−
+  SE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Correctness ratings after ‘erroneous’ prediction – Experiment 2 (Error bars represent 
1−
+  SE). 
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Figure 7. Credibility difference scores by communication format – Experiment 3 (Error bars 
represent 1−
+  SE). 
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Figure 8. Credibility difference scores by communication format – Experiment 3 (Error bars 
represent 1−
+  SE) – the scenario × numeracy interaction. 
 
 
Figure 9. Correctness ratings after ‘erroneous’ prediction by numeracy (high/low) – 
Experiment 3 (Error bars represent 1−
+  SE). 
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Table 1  
Distribution (%) of Numeracy Scores by Experiment 
  Numeracy Classification  
 Low 
 
   High  
Numeracy 
Score 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
  9  10 
Mean 
(SD) 
Expt 1 0.3 1.4 1.4 0.0 1.7 3.4 5.2 13.7 30.6 
 
25.1 17.2 
7.98 
(1.81) 
Expt 2 0.4 0.8 2.1 1.6 1.2 5.3 6.6 18.1 26.7 
 
20.6 16.5 
7.72 
(1.93) 
Expt 3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.6 2.8 4.1 11.8 23.6 
 
33.3 24.4 
8.41 
(1.42) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
 Behavioural Measures – Mean Scores Across All Experiments by Numeracy 
Experiment 
Behavioural Measure 
Numeracy Level 
Communication Format - Mean Score (SE) 
Verbal Numerical Point V-N N-V 
Numerical Wide 
Range 
Numerical 
Narrow Range 
1. n 75 70 74 72 N/A N/A 
1.  Evacuation Difference 
Score* 
Low Numeracy 
 
 
-0.68 (0.22) 
 
 
-0.64 (0.23) 
 
 
-0.48 (0.22) 
 
 
-0.56 (0.20) 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
High Numeracy -0.67 (0.24) -0.91 (0.24) -0.88 (0.25) -0.04 (0.29) N/A N/A 
       
2. n 78 82 N/A N/A 83 N/A 
2. Insurance Difference 
Score (£) 
Low Numeracy 
 
 
120.11 (24.86) 
 
 
159.02 (22.49) 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
108.02 (22.91) 
 
 
N/A 
High Numeracy 188.39 (28.42) 129.17 (32.06) N/A N/A 125.56 (27.45) N/A 
       
3. n N/A 84 N/A N/A 83 79 
3. Insurance Difference 
Score (£) 
Low Numeracy 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
84.82 (20.05) 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
122.62 (23.22) 
 
 
105.75 (24.83) 
High Numeracy N/A 166.47 (20.61) N/A N/A 88.25 (19.25) 94.88 (18.34) 
 
*Lower scores indicate participants were more certain about evacuating instantly 
